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Introduction	
‘In	the	distant	lands	the	battle	rages,	will	this	bleak	horror	never	cease?	
Can	we,	who	fought	through	all	the	ages,	make	lasting	peace?’		
James	T.	Shotwell1	
	
On	 June	 2018,	 the	 current	 president	 of	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo,	 Joseph	 Kabila	
announced	that	he	would	not	run	a	re-election	campaign	and	would	thus	not	be	eligible	for	
a	 third	 term	 as	 president	 of	 the	Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 (Al	 Jazeera,	 2018).	 Joseph	
Kabila	 has	 been	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 since	 January	 2001,	
when	he	came	to	power	after	his	 father	was	assassinated	that	same	year	 (Manson,	2018).	
Joseph	 Kabila	 was	 re-elected	 in	 both	 2006	 and	 2011,	 which	 makes	 him	 the	 political	
strongman	of	the	country	for	the	past	seventeen	years	(Chan,	2018).	Although	the	initial	re-
elections	 were	 scheduled	 back	 in	 2016,	 they	 never	 took	 place,	 leaving	 the	 international	
community	once	again	worried	about	the	democratic	future	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo.	That	is,	until	last	month,	when	the	Trump	Administration	announced	that	they	were	
prepared	to	impose	sanctions	against	president	Kabila	in	an	attempt	to	discourage	him	from	
remaining	 in	power	(Manson,	2018).	The	 latest	development	 is	 that	the	prayers	from	both	
the	United	States	and	the	international	community	seem	to	have	been	heard,	as	president	
Kabila	finally	announced	that	he	will	step	down	from	his	presidency	by	the	end	of	this	year,	
giving	the	power	back	to	the	people	(Chan,	2018).	The	upcoming	elections	are	scheduled	for	
December	 2018	 and	 raise	 a	 slight	 hope	 that	 the	 ‘country	 might	 carry	 out	 a	 peaceful	
transition	of	power	for	the	first	time	in	its	modern	history’	which	should	bring	democracy	in	
the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	one	step	closer	(Chan,	2018,	1).	
			
The	Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 [hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 the	Congo]	 is	 not	 an	 isolated	
case.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	promotion	of	democracy	within	Africa	 seems	 to	be	a	 recurrent	
topic	of	concern	in	the	world	of	International	Politics.	Even	though	numerous	elections	have	
taken	place	 in	Africa,	 the	 road	 towards	democracy	continues	 to	be	a	 slippery	one,	 riddled	
with	 puddles,	 holes	 and	 obstructions.	 Despite	 the	 time,	 effort	 and	money	 that	 has	 been	
invested	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy,	 especially	 within	 Africa,	 the	 outcome	 could	 be	
																																																						
1 James T. Shotwell. ’Is it the Dawn?’ in Governing the World, The History of an Idea, p. 192.  
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summed	 up	 as	 somewhat	 unfortunate.	 Many	 elections	 within	 Africa	 fall	 short	 of	 the	
minimum	standards	that	are	required	to	live	up	to	the	principles	of	democracy.	In	order	for	
elections	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 democratic,	 they	 must	 be	 at	 least	 free,	 liberal	 and	 include	
multiple	 competing	 parties	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 Practice	 has	 learned	 that	 securing	
these	 basic	 principles	 of	 democracy	 already	 creates	 a	 serious	 challenge	 in	 many	 African	
countries	transiting	into	democracies	(Hennemeyer,	2011).	While	some	African	countries	are	
small	 and	 come	 close	 to	 resembling	 a	 nation-state,	 democracy	 seems	 a	 promising	 and	
feasible	 concept.	 However,	 when	 looking	 at	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Congo,	 a	 country	 the	 size	 of	
Western	Europe,	that	harbours	more	that	250	different	ethnic	groups	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	
2005),	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 elections	 already	 become	
more	challenging.	Add	to	this	the	 incredibly	wealth	of	the	country’s	soil,	containing	50	per	
cent	of	the	world’s	cobalt	–	vastly	used	in	mobile	phone	chips	–,	30	per	cent	of	its	diamonds,	
20	per	cent	of	its	copper,	and	sizable	amounts	of	gold,	and	one	finds	an	interesting	case	in	
the	field	of	International	Politics	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005,	p.	28).		
	
Very	few	outsiders	will	consider	the	Congo	to	be	a	blooming	country,	known	for	the	energy	
of	 its	 people	 who	 have	 shown	 extreme	 resilience	 after	 decades	 of	 unfortunate	 events	
(Stearns,	2011).	 Instead,	the	Congo	 is	often	viewed,	both	 in	academic	 literature	and	 in	the	
media,	as	a	lost	cause,	a	country	that	even	the	most	extended	peacebuilding	mission	could	
not	save.	The	country	is	widely	known	for	its	conflictive	behaviour	–	fighting	with	rebels	and	
militias	over	minerals,	being	 in	conflict	with	 several	neighbouring	countries	–	 for	 the	huge	
refugee	 camps	 that	 only	 spread	 more	 illness	 and	 poverty,	 and	 last	 but	 not	 least	 for	 its	
‘corruptive	 power-seeking	 government’	 (Stearns,	 2011).	 Again	 today,	 this	 is	 the	 image	
represented	by	 the	media	 through	 the	headlines,	 reports	about	 the	power	struggle	within	
the	 government,	 the	 president’s	 unwillingness	 to	 step	 down	 from	 office	 and	 the	 current	
Ebola	outbreak	that	led	to	around	101	deaths	as	a	result	of	the	virus	(Manson,	2018;	WHO,	
2018).	 All	 of	 this	 shines	 a	 negative	 light	 on	 the	 country	 by	 emphasizing	 the	 troubles	 it	 is	
facing,	while	simultaneously	enforcing	the	country’s	helpless	character.		
	
However,	the	question	remains	whether	this	is	indeed	a	fair	representation	of	the	country.	
Could	 it	be	 that	Western	media	and	politicians	 simply	misunderstand	 the	country	and	 the	
root	causes	of	its	demons?	Could	it	be	that	the	United	Nations	and	other	agencies	involved,	
simply	did	not	invest	enough	time	and	energy	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	troubles	that	are	
haunting	 the	 country	 for	 the	 last	 decades,	 which	 subsequently	 prevented	 MONUC	 from	
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performing	 an	 adequate	 strategy,	 essentially	 never	 really	 giving	 democracy	 the	 chance	 to	
flourish?	 Should	 we	 therefore	 believe	 the	 statement	 in	 The	 New	 York	 Times,	 saying	 that	
there	 is	 still	 hope	 for	 the	Congolese	people	 and	 the	 country	 to	 finally	 become	a	 safe	 and	
functioning	democracy	(Chan,	2018)?		
	
This	 thesis	 aims	 to	 find	 an	 answer	 to	 all	 these	 questions	 by	 using	 the	method	 of	 process	
tracing:	 to	 see	 how	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 has	 been	 performed	 within	 the	 Congo.	
Process	tracing	is	a	method	commonly	used	‘within-case	study	analysis	based	on	qualitative	
data’	 (Collier,	 2011,	 823).	 This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Congo	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 how	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy,	 performed	 by	 the	 United	 Nations’	mission	
MONUC,	came	to	be	unsuccessful	in	realising	peace	in	the	country,	by	analysing	the	within-
case	 factors	 of	 both	 the	 country	 and	 the	 mandate	 involved,	 and	 looking	 at	 the	 causal	
inference.	 The	 key	 contribution	 of	 this	 study	 will	 be	 descriptive	 by	 nature.	 It	 aims	 at	
understanding	 how	 sequencing	 events,	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 democracy	within	 the	 Congo,	
led	 to	 unwanted	 side	 effects	 and	were	mostly	 unsuccessful	 in	 their	 outcome.	 In	 order	 to	
understand	what	went	wrong	 in	 the	Congo	and	why	elections	had	unwanted	 side	effects,	
this	 thesis	will	 devote	 extensive	 attention	 to	understanding	 the	historical	 background	and	
social	 issues	 of	 the	 country,	 because	 only	 then	 cautious	 assumptions	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	
observations.	 This	 study	will	 contribute	 to	 the	 already	 existing	 literature	 on	 the	Congo	by	
mapping	 the	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 factors	 that	may	 have	 obstructed	 the	
conflict	 resolution	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 democracy.	 Next,	 this	 thesis	 will	 raise	 a	
discussion	 on	what	 could	 have	 been	 done	 differently	 during	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	
within	the	country	and	offers	suggestions	on	how	democracy	could	have	been	implemented	
more	 effectively	 in	 the	 Congo	 and	 other	 countries	 during	 their	 transition	 to	 becoming	 a	
democracy.	Although	this	thesis	exclusively	looks	at	the	case	of	the	Congo,	the	suggestions	
that	are	made	could,	with	cautious	consideration,	be	applied	 to	other	cases,	which	makes	
this	thesis	a	valuable	addition	to	the	existing	literature	on	the	Congo	and	on	the	promotion	
of	democracy.			
	
Consequently,	the	research	question	of	this	thesis	will	be:	How	could	democracy	have	been	
promoted	more	effectively	by	MONUC	within	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo?	To	answer	
this	question	 this	 thesis	will	 first	 look	at	 the	 ideology	behind	 the	promotion	of	democracy	
and	 why	 it	 is	 adopted	 within	 foreign	 policy.	 Then	 a	 literature	 study	 will	 follow	 that	 will	
review	 the	 already	 existing	 work	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 with	 its	 critiques	 and	
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failures	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 unwanted	 side	 effects,	 such	 as	 the	 recurrence	 of	
violence,	 can	be	prevented	when	 reaching	 the	 goal	 of	 creating	 a	 democratic	 government.	
After	 a	 brief	 historical	 overview	will	 offer	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 historical	 background	 of	 the	
country	 and	 the	 issues	 and	 violence	 it	 is	 currently	 facing.	 Finally,	 the	 theory	 presented	
earlier,	will	be	applied	 to	 the	case	of	 the	Congo,	 in	 the	 light	of	analysing	what	could	have	
been	 done	 differently	 during	 the	 democratic	 promotion	 within	 the	 country.	 This	 thesis	
reasons	 that	 the	 strategy	 used	within	MONUC	was	 not	 suitable	 for	 the	 country	 as	 it	 was	
highly	 concentrated	 on	 the	 national	 level,	 barely	 taking	 the	 important	 local	 issues	 and	
causes	 for	 the	 continuing	 of	 violence	 into	 account.	 Next	 this	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 the	
promotion	of	 democracy	had	unwanted	 side	effects	 that	partly	 evolved	 from	 the	MONUC	
mandate	that	highly	prioritised	elections	over	the	implementation	of	institutions	that	could	
have	guided	the	elections	and	regulated	the	local	security	issues	that	the	country	was	facing.		
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Chapter	1:	The	Promotion	of	Democracy	
	
Before	we	go	 into	 the	 case	 study	of	 the	Congo,	 it	 is	 important	 to	explain	more	about	 the	
origin	of	 the	 international	 intervention	 that	 exist	within	 the	Congo	and	 their	 focus	on	 the	
promotion	of	democracy,	both	in	the	Congo	and	in	Africa.	The	promotion	of	democracy	on	
the	African	continent	finds	its	origin	towards	the	end	of	the	20th	century.	During	the	end	of	
the	 Cold	War	 and	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 there	was	 a	 new	wave	 of	 democracy	
promotion	during	which	 the	 international	 community	 opened	up	 the	dialogue	on	political	
openness	 and	 the	democratic	 future	of	many	undemocratic	 states	within	Africa,	 including	
the	 countries	 Benin,	 Cameroon,	 Congo	 and	 Togo	 (Hennemeyer,	 2011,	 55).	 At	 that	 time,	
democracy	was	seen	as	 the	only	 rightful	 type	of	governance	 that	 should	help	Africa	break	
free	 from	 its	 traditional	 undemocratic	 character,	 as	many	 states	were	 still	 led	 by	 political	
strongmen	who	came	into	power	after	(often)	bloody	coups	(Hennemeyer,	2011).	
	
The	ideology	behind	the	promotion	of	democracy	in	foreign	states	is	interesting	as	it	can	be	
viewed	 from	 many	 different	 perspectives.	 One	 way	 of	 looking	 at	 it,	 is	 by	 using	 the	
democratic	peace	theory.	This	theory	is	based	on	the	notion	that	democracies	are	hesitant	
to	engage	in	conflict	with	each	other.	Or	as	President	Clinton	put	it	in	his	State	of	the	Union	
address	 in	 1994:	 ‘Democracies	 don’t	 attack	 each	 other’	 (Owen,	 1994,	 87).	 In	 light	 of	 this	
theory,	 the	worldwide	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 should	 optimistically	 lead	 to	more	 peace,	
which	makes	it	an	appealing	theory	to	promote	for	it	promoters.		
	
One	 of	 the	 explanations	 of	 why	 democracy	 has	 peace	 inducing	 characters,	 comes	 from	
Kant’s	 (1795)	 essay:	 ‘Perpetual	 Peace:	A	 Philosophical	 Sketch’.	 In	 this	 essay,	 Kant	 explains	
the	 concept	 of	 a	 Republican	 Constitution	 and	 how	 this	 type	 of	 governance	 has	 the	most	
feasible	chance	of	leading	to	a	perpetual	peace	(Kant,	1795).	One	of	the	core	arguments	in	
Kant’s	essay	 is,	that	 in	a	Republican	Constitution	the	citizens	are	full	members	of	the	state	
and	thus	required	to	give	their	consent	to	the	question:	‘Whether	there	shall	be	war	or	not’	
(Kant,	 1795,	 90).	 In	 the	 event	 of	 war,	 the	 citizens	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 have	 to	 fight,	 are	
responsible	for	providing	the	costs	and,	in	the	end,	have	to	bear	the	burden	of	the	acquired	
debt	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 war.	 When	 taking	 all	 these	 costs	 into	 account,	 the	 likelihood	 of	
citizens	giving	their	consent	to	pursue	war,	can	be	regarded	as	extremely	low	(Kant,	1795).	
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For	 this	 reason,	 the	chances	of	war	within	a	Republican	Constitution	are	considered	 to	be	
significantly	smaller	than	in	any	other	type	of	governance	whereby	the	state	does	not	need	
the	 approval	 of	 the	 citizens	before	 going	 to	war	 (Kant,	 1795).	 Even	 though	Kant	 does	not	
directly	refer	to	democracies,	there	are	some	clear	resemblances	between	a	democracy	and	
a	Republican	Constitution,	primarily	as	 they	both	rely	on	the	citizens	 for	 their	governance,	
that	is,	there	has	to	be	a	public	consent	before	going	to	war.		
	
Besides	 the	 peace	 inducing	 qualities	 that	 democracies	 possibly	 have,	 there	 are	 also	 other	
incentives	 for	 countries	 to	 promote	 democracy	 in	 foreign	 countries.	 According	 to	 Owen	
(2012)	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 is	 driven	 from	 a	 source	 of	 fear	 and	 suspicion.	 Owen	
(2012)	claims	that	regimes	are	suspicious	of	different	minded	regimes	and	therefore	feel	the	
need	to	transform	them.	The	promotion	of	certain	regimes	as	such	is	nothing	new	and	is	not	
only	 performed	 by	 democracies.	 Leading	 regimes	 have	 been	 promoting	 themselves	 for	
centuries	 (0wen,	 2012).	 When	 reflecting	 on	 European	 history,	 ‘the	 tendency	 to	 promote	
one’s	 own	 domestic	 regime‘	 becomes	 even	more	 evident	 (Owen,	 2012,	 p.	 17).	 It	 appears	
that	almost	any	 leading	regime	during	a	certain	time	felt	an	urge	to	either	expand	 its	own	
system	 or	 suppress	 the	 conflictive	 system	 in	 the	 nearby	 countries.	 In	 the	 past,	 this	
phenomenon	has	been	visible	in	‘monarchies,	communist,	fascist	states’	and	even	‘catholic	
and	protestant	states’	(Owen,	2012,	p.	17).	The	driving	force	behind	regime	promotion	could	
be	explained	on	the	one	hand	by	protecting	one’s	own	interest,	while	on	the	other	hand	it	is	
seen	 as	 a	 way	 to	 expand	 a	 leading	 ideology	 as	 opposed	 to	 another,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	
rivalry	or	contradicting	ideologies	to	flourish,	as	was	the	case	during	and	after	the	cold	war	
(Mazower,	2012).		
	
A	problem	with	this	 last	statement	 is	that	 it	 implies	the	 involvement	of	self-interest	within	
international	politics	 by	 the	practice	of	democratic	promotion.	 Some	 scholars	believe	 that	
the	only	motivation	countries	have	to	participate	 in	 foreign	 intervention	 is	to	protect	their	
own	 interest.	Kuhn	 (2012),	as	an	example,	mentions	 in	one	of	his	articles,	 that	 the	United	
Nations	legitimises	their	politics	of	state	and	regime	reform	by	labelling	it	as	peace	practices	
in	overseas	countries.	The	real	story,	according	to	Kuhn,	is	that	by	reforming	and	liberating	
these	countries	the	 international	community	 is	actually	 ‘protecting	the	capitalist	core	from	
the	non-liberal	periphery’	(Kuhn,	2012,	403).	The	articles	of	Zeese	(2006)	and	Medani	(2004)	
even	 illustrate	 this	 assumption	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Iraq	 and	 claim	 that	 the	 liberalisation	
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democratisation	 of	 Iraq	 was	 merely	 a	 facade	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 western	 interests.	
	
	
Chapter	2:	Analysing	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	
	
The	last	chapter	explained	the	background	and	theory	behind	the	promotion	of	democracy	
within	foreign	states.	When	looking	at	the	promotion	of	democracy	within	the	Congo,	the	
main	focus	of	analysis	will	be	on	elections	and	the	implementation	of	them,	in	order	to	see	
how	democracy	was	systematically	promoted	within	the	country.	The	motivation	for	this	
focus	can	be	best	explained	with	a	quote	from	the	Afrobarometer	working	paper	(2007).	In	
this	paper,	the	authors	explain	their	focus	on	elections	when	reviewing	democracy	as	
follows:		
	
Election	is	a	means	for	realising	some	of	the	core	values	of	democracy,	especially	the	
participation	 of	 the	 citizen	 in	 governance	 and	 the	 accountability	 of	 leaders.	 The	
quality	of	election	therefore	provides	an	indicator	of	the	extent	to	which	democratic	
governance	 has	 been	 consolidated	 in	 society.	 Given	 the	 intricate	 relationship	
between	election	and	democracy,	measurement	of	democracy	is	often	conflated	with	
the	measurement	of	election	quality.	(Alemika,	2007,	p.	5)	
	
Since	it	is	difficult	to	measure	democracy	directly,	this	thesis	will	focus	on	elections	in	order	
to	analyse	how	democracy	has	been	implemented	and	executed	within	the	Congo,	next	to	
the	close	and	intertwined	relationship	that	democracy	and	elections	have	–	as	 is	explained	
above.	The	realisation	of	elections	was	also	a	focal	point	in	the	mandate	of	MONUC,	making	
it	a	valid	starting	point	 for	analysis	 (Autessere,	2010).	The	promotion	of	democracy	within	
foreign	countries	has	been	 firmly	criticised	 throughout	 the	years.	For	 this	 reason,	 some	of	
these	 critiques	will	 be	discussed	 in	 the	upcoming	 section	and	 shall	 later	be	applied	 to	 the	
case	of	the	Congo.	
	
A	recurring	remark	made	by	International	Relations	scholars,	is	that	the	promotion	and	the	
implementation	of	democracy	is	ineffective	because	the	countries	are	completely	unfamiliar	
with	 the	 concept	 of	 democracy	 (Boege,	 Brown,	 Clements	 &	 Nolan,	 2009).	 Scholars	 are	
concerned	that	the	promotion	of	democracy,	which	 is	 largely	constructed	around	Western	
ideas	 and	 values	 of	 statehood,	 is	 ineffective	 in	 its	 practice	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 these	
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countries	lack	the	foundations	and	experience	needed	for	democracy	to	thrive	(Boege	et	al.,	
2009).	Many	 countries	where	 democracy	 has	 been	promoted	 in	 the	 past	 decades,	 do	 not	
have	any	history	with	democracy,	neither	do	they	resemble	the	Westphalian	model	or	idea	
of	 a	 state	 (Paris,	 2004).	 According	 to	 some	 scholars,	 next	 to	 the	 argument	 of	 democracy	
being	 a	 foreign	 concept,	 comes	 the	 unrealistic	 expectation	 and	 speed	 in	 which	 the	
democratic	reforms	are	being	achieved.	Trotha	(2009)	underlines	this	and	explains	that	state	
building	 is	 not	 something	 a	 country	 can	 learn;	 instead	 it	 is	 a	 process	 that	 needs	 time	 to	
evolve.	 ‘State	 formation	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	Western	world	 took	 centuries’	 and	was	 often	
paralleled	with	extreme	violence	 in	establishing	a	 legitimate	monopoly	of	 force	 (Barnett	&	
Zurcher,	2006;	Boege	et	al.,	2009,	18).	Unfortunately,	 interventions	today	do	not	have	the	
required	time,	money	or	personnel	when	 it	comes	to	reforming	states	and	often	prefer	 to	
refrain	from	using	violence,	if	at	all	possible	(Paris,	2004).	Therefore,	many	scholars	consider	
the	 lack	 of	 a	 democratic	 history,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 time	 that	 is	 needed	 for	 a	
country	to	evolve	into	a	functioning	state,	to	be	an	explanation	for	why	rapidly	transformed	
democracies	often	tend	to	fail	(Boege	et	al.,	2009).		
		
In	 addition	 to	 those	 who	 discuss	 the	 rate,	 unrealistic	 expectations	 or	 the	 fact	 that	 some	
countries	might	be	less	suited	for	democracy	than	others,	there	is	a	group	of	scholars	who	
focus	 on	 the	 practical	 implications	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	when	 expressing	 their	
concerns.	They	believe	that	institutions	such	as	the	United	Nations,	often	use	a	one	size	fits	
all	 policy	 without	 thoroughly	 investigating	 a	 country’s	 unique	 characteristics	 before	
implementing	their	strategy.	The	elections	within	the	Congo	received	similar	critiques	as	the	
implementation	 of	 the	 elections	 was	 predominantly	 focussing	 on	 a	 macro	 level,	 barely	
taking	local	issues	and	actors	into	account	(Autesserre,	2012).	Most	United	Nations	missions,	
including	MONUC,	see	the	promotion	of	democracy	as	a	top-down	affair	without	scrutinizing	
the	local	structures	of	governance	and	root	causes	that	instigate	the	violence,	even	though	
these	factors	can	obstruct	the	positive	outcome	of	elections	(Autesserre,	2012).	They	argue	
that	more	 attention	 should	 be	 given	 to	 understanding	 a	 country’s	 history,	 grievances	 and	
issues	 that	 could	 obstruct	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 and,	 additionally,	 more	 attention	
should	 be	 paid	 to	 including	 local	 structures	 of	 governance	 (Menkhaus,	 2008;	 Richmond,	
2009;	Weijer	2011).		
	
Next	 to	 the	 substantial	 critiques	 listed	 above,	 other	 critics	 focus	 on	 the	 practical	 aspects	
concerning	the	mandate	of	the	promotion	of	democracy.	These	scholars	are	concerned	with	
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the	side	effects	of	promoting	democracy	within	the	host	countries	and	the	implications	this	
promotion	might	have	when	it	is	carried	out	inadequately	or	prematurely.	The	focus	on	the	
‘growing	 pains’	 of	 emerging	 democracies	 is	 not	 surprising	 as	 studies	 have	 shown	 how	
countries	 that	are	 transitioning	 into	democracies	 seem	 to	be	 ‘especially	prone	 to	 civil	 and	
international	 conflict,	 violent	 revolution	or	even	ethnic	bloodshed’	 (Mansfield	and	Snyder,	
2007,	 5).	 After	 all,	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 indirectly	 sponsors	 competition	 between	
rival	 parties,	 especially	 when	 elections	 are	 being	 held	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 during	 these	
transformation	processes	(Mansfield	and	Snyder,	2007).		
	
As	a	consequence,	one	side	effect	of	democracy	can	be	that	it	runs	counter	to	its	objectives:	
it	 occasionally	 increases	 the	 chances	 of	 violence	 instead	 of	 reducing	 it	 (Luttwak,	 1999;	
Ramsbotham	et	al.,	2011).	Taking	this	risk	into	consideration,	many	scholars	believe	that	it	is	
necessary	 to	 first	 establish	 some	 preconditions	 that	 may	 help	 to	 guide	 and	 enable	 the	
peaceful	 transition	of	a	country	 into	a	democracy,	before	promoting	 it.	 In	agreement	with	
this	 last	statement	are	the	scholars	Mansfield	and	Snyder,	who	believe	that	new	emerging	
countries	on	 their	way	 to	becoming	a	democracy	are	 too	vulnerable	 to	 show	 resilience	 to	
the	violence	and	 revolution	 that	often	accompanies	open	political	 competition	 (2007).	 For	
this	 reason,	 they	 advocate	 that	 before	 having	 elections	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 some	
prerequisites	 in	 place,	 such	 as	 impartial	 state	 institutions,	 that	 can	 handle	 the	 uprising	
tension	evoked	by	 the	democratic	 transition	 (Mansfield	 and	 Snyder,	 2007).	Without	 these	
necessary	 preconditions	 in	 place,	 having	 elections	 can	 be	 both	 ineffective	 and	 extremely	
dangerous,	according	to	Mansfield	and	Snyder	(2005).	The	strategy	behind	promoting	state	
institutions	 before	 elections	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 sequencing	 and	 finds	 its	 example	 in	 Great	
Britain’s	path	to	democracy	during	the	19th	century	during	which	the	country	strengthened	
its	‘legal	system,	representative	institutions	and	free	press’	before	it	implemented	the	open	
electoral	processes	(Mansfield	and	Snyder,	2007,	p.	5).		
	
In	 opposition	 to	 sequencing	 is	 gradualism,	 which	 takes	 a	 different	 approach	 on	 how	
democracy	should	be	promoted	within	countries.	In	line	with	gradualism,	it	 is	 important	to	
pursue	open	elections	at	an	early	stage,	even	before	other	statebuilding	practices,	such	as	
the	rule	of	 law	or	 impartial	governmental	 institutions,	have	been	 implemented	(Carothers,	
2007).	The	promotion	of	elections,	above	all	else,	should	come	first	while	other	institutional	
and	 legal	 reforms	 can	 be	 pursued	 simultaneously	 or	 consecutively	 (Carothers,	 2007).	
Carothers	 (2007),	 a	 leading	professor	on	 the	 topic	of	democratisation,	 states	 that	without	
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open	political	competition	the	chances	of	a	new	country	ending	up	under	authoritarian	rule	
would	 increase,	which,	 in	 turn,	would	 jeopardise	the	possible	evolvement	of	a	state	 into	a	
democracy.	 For	 this	 reason,	 gradualism	 is	 in	 favour	 of	 having	 elections	 in	 an	 early	 phase,	
even	 if	 the	 circumstances	 might	 not	 be	 very	 favourable	 yet.	 A	 different	 argument	 for	
gradualism,	 stated	 by	 Carothers	 (2007),	 is	 that	 most	 people	 in	 developing	 countries	 see	
democracy	 as	 the	 ultimate	 desirable	 form	 of	 government:	 even	 if	 the	 transition	 to	
democracy	would	be	risky,	it	would	be	a	risk	the	people	are	willing	to	take	(Carothers,	2007).	
Whether	 or	 not	 this	 last	 statement	 is	 also	 applicable	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Congo	 is	 arguable	 as	
some	 academics	 state	 that	 the	 Congolese	 people	 merely	 see	 democracy	 as	 a	 Western	
concept,	implemented	by	the	West	to	reclaim	control	in	the	country	(de	Goede,	2015).		
	
As	described	above,	each	strategy	takes	a	different	approach	to	promoting	democracy	and	
thus	 they	 inevitably	 criticize	 each	 other.	 One	 criticism	 directed	 at	 sequencing,	 is	 the	
ambiguity	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 impartial	 state	 institutions.	 Promoters	 of	 sequencing,	mention	
that	institutions	need	to	be	implemented	before	elections	can	take	place,	in	order	to	avert	
any	violent	upsurge	(Mansfield	and	Snyder,	2005).	It	 is,	however,	unclear	when	these	state	
institutions	are	mature	and	functional	enough	to	handle	the	risks	and	the	tensions	that	go	
hand	in	hand	with	open	elections	(Carothers,	2007).		
	 Another	question	that	arises	when	analysing	the	sequencing	theory	is:	what	is	going	
to	 be	 the	 ruling	 alternative	 while	 states	 are	 developing	 their	 impartial	 state	 institutions,	
which	 can	 take	 many	 years	 if	 not	 decades	 (Carothers,	 2007)?	 Gradualism	 believes	 the	
answer	 to	 this	 question	 to	 be:	 an	 authoritarian	 rule,	which,	 according	 to	 them,	 forms	 the	
biggest	obstacle	for	implementing	democracy	in	the	long	run.		
	
Besides	 the	 critique	 on	 sequencing,	 there	 are	 also	 several	 scholars	 who	 would	 rather	
promote	 this	 theory	 than	gradualism.	The	most	used	argument	on	behalf	of	 sequencing	 is	
that	emerging	countries,	in	their	transition	to	becoming	a	democracy,	are	simply	too	prone	
to	the	re-emergence	of	war	and	violence	while	there	are	still	no	proper	institutions	in	place	
(Reilly,	 2011).	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 risks	 of	 uprising	 violence	 evoked	 by	 open	 political	
elections,	 the	 chances	 of	 a	 successful	 transition	without	 any	 impartial	 state	 institutions	 in	
place	 are	 considered	 relatively	 slim	 (Mansfield	 and	 Snyder,	 2007).	 The	 cases	 ‘Iraq’	 and	
‘Lebanon’	may	 illustrate	 this	 notion	 as	 they	 show	how	political	 competition	 led	 to	 ‘ethnic	
and	 sectarian	divisions	 in	a	 traditional	 society’,	which	 in	 turn	obstructed	 the	 realisation	of	
democracy	(Mansfield	and	Snyder,	2005,	7).	Therefore,	within	the	framework	of	sequencing,	
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it	 is	 essential	 to	 have	 impartial	 state	 institutions	 in	 place	 that	 are	 able	 to	 guide	 the	
democratic	 transition	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 violent	 or	 cultural	 separation	 within	 a	 country	
(Reilly,	2011).	
	
Apart	 from	 the	 differences	 between	 sequencing	 and	 gradualism	 there	 is	 one	 aspect	 that	
both	theories	agree	on,	namely	preventing	a	country	from	taking	the	illiberal	and	autocratic	
route.	Although	this	might	seem	obvious,	there	are	in	fact	some	scholars	who	argue	that	this	
route	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 bad	 one.	 Zakaria	 states	 that	 ‘while	 democracy	 is	 flourishing,	
constitutional	 liberalism	 is	 not’	 (Zakaria,	 1997,	 23).	 By	 this	 statement,	 Zakaria	 (1997)	
acknowledges	 the	 fact	 that	on	paper	many	countries	did	become	democracies	after	1989,	
but	he	simultaneously	questions	to	what	extent	these	countries	can	really	be	considered	to	
be	democratic.	In	his	article:	‘The	Rise	of	Illiberal	Democracy’,	Zakaria	claims	that	almost	half	
of	 the	newly	emerged	democracies	are	 in	 fact	 illiberal.	Countries	 that	have	open	elections	
are	 often	 immediately	 considered	 to	 be	 democratic.	 However,	 within	 these	 new	
democracies	the	population	frequently	 lacks	 inalienable	rights,	such	as	freedom	of	speech,	
freedom	of	 religion	and	basic	 laws	that	should	protect	 individuals	 from	the	state	and	 limit	
the	state’s	power	(Hennemeyer,	2011).		
These	 rights	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 constitutional	 liberalism,	 and,	 according	 to	 Zakaria,	
Europe	 and	 North	 America	 adopted	 the	 characteristics	 of	 constitutional	 liberalism	 long	
before	becoming	democracies	(Zakaria,	1997).	The	same	process	is	now	visible	in	countries	
within	Asia,	such	as	Singapore	and	even	Thailand,	which	might	be	regarded	as	undemocratic	
countries,	 but	 do	 show	 many	 features	 of	 constitutional	 liberalism	 (Zakaria,	 1997).	
Interestingly,	whereas	 constitutional	 liberalism	may	possibly	 pave	 the	way	 for	 democracy,	
democracy	 does	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 constitutional	 liberalism	 in	 return	 (Reilly,	 2011).	
Following	 this	 reasoning,	 the	main	 claim	 that	 Zakaria	makes,	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 promoting	
open	 elections	 and	 focussing	 only	 on	 democracy,	 the	 main	 focus	 should	 be	 on	 the	
implementation	of	a	liberal	governance	with	an	emphasis	on	basic	human	rights	–	which	is	
often	neglected	within	peace-	and	statebuilding	missions	(Zakaria,	1997).		
	
The	 aim	 of	 the	 last	 chapter	 was,	 first,	 to	 give	 some	 insight	 into	 the	 literature	 of	 the	
promotion	of	democracy	and	secondly	to	provide	a	framework	that	can	be	used	to	analyse	
the	case	of	Congo.	While	analysing	the	case	of	Congo,	both	sequencing	and	gradualism	will	
be	useful	for	understanding	which	strategy	MONUC	adopted	to	promote	democracy	and	for	
what	 reasons.	 Additionally,	 understanding	 both	 sequencing	 and	 gradualism	 makes	 it	
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possible	to	see	how	the	promotion	of	democracy	could	be	implemented	more	effectively	in	
the	case	of	Congo	by	reviewing	the	implications	of	the	strategy	that	was	used.		
Before	 the	 above-mentioned	 theories	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 case	 study,	 the	 following	
chapter	will	 first	provide	some	background	 information	about	 the	Congo	 itself,	 in	order	 to	
examine	 how	 the	 theories	 relate	 and	 apply	 to	 the	 peacebuilding	 mission	 MONUC.	
Furthermore,	the	purpose	of	the	following	chapter	is	to	gain	insights	in	the	(colonial)	history	
and	the	conflict	within	the	Congo	and	to	identify	some	of	the	main	actors	that	are	involved	
and	 responsible	 for	 the	on-going	violence	 in	 the	country.	This	 chapter	 is	 significant	as	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 understand	 the	 struggles	 of	 the	 country	 on	 its	 way	 to	 democracy	 without	
understanding	the	country’s	history	with	democracy	and	authoritarian	governance	as	well	as	
the	major	events	that	affected	the	Congolese	people	in	their	hopes	and	believes.		
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Chapter	4:	The	Case	Study		
	
As	mentioned	earlier,	the	country	that	will	be	analysed	in	this	thesis	as	the	case	study	is	the	
Congo.	 The	 main	 reason	 for	 studying	 the	 Congo	 is	 the	 interest	 of	 this	 thesis	 in	 the	
transitional	 process	 of	 a	 country	 from	 war	 and	 conflict	 to	 peace	 and	 democracy.	 In	 this	
respect,	 the	 Congo	 is	 an	 interesting	 case	 as	 it	 did	 not	 only	 endure	 the	 ‘deadliest	 conflict	
since	World	War	 II’,	 but	 also	 hosted	 one	 of	 the	most	 extensive	 and	 wide-ranging	 United	
Nations	 peacebuilding	missions	 ever	 performed	with	 the	 intention	 to	 establish	 peace	 and	
democracy	 (Autesserre,	 2009,	 251).	 Next	 to	 the	 policy	 that	 targeted	 the	 promotion	 of	
democracy,	 the	 mission	 was	 also	 one	 of	 the	 first,	 largest	 and	 most	 comprehensive	
peacebuilding	missions	 ever	 carried	out	 in	Africa	 by	 the	United	Nations,	which	makes	 the	
mission	 an	even	more	 interesting	 source	 for	 further	 analysis	 (Autesserre,	 2009;	 Congo	DR	
Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	
	
The	 mission	 referred	 to	 here,	 is	 nowadays	 known	 as	 the	 United	 Nations	 Organisation	
Mission	in	the	Congo	(MONUC	-	Resolution	1279,	1999).	The	initial	goal	of	the	mission	was	
primarily	‘to	observe’	and	with	its	implementation,	the	United	Nations	wanted	to	make	sure	
that	 the	Lusaka	Ceasefire	Agreement	was	honoured	and	realised	by	all	 signatories	 (Lusaka	
Ceasefire	Agreement,	1999;	Resolution	1279,	1999).	Due	to	the	continuation	of	violence,	the	
MONUC	mandate	 did	 however	 change	 over	 the	 years,	making	 the	mission	more	 inclusive	
and	 wide-ranging.	 In	 2010,	 the	 Security	 Council	 renamed	 MONUC:	 the	 United	 Nations	
Organization	Stabilization	Mission	in	the	Congo	(MONUSCO),	 in	accordance	with	resolution	
1925	(Resolution	1925,	2010).	To	this	day,	MONUSCO	is	still	active	in	the	Congo.		
	
A	short	overview	of	the	history	of	the	Congo	will	now	be	given	with	as	the	focus	of	attention,	
the	period	from	1990	until	2006.	
	
To	begin	with,	the	following	demographic	details	about	the	Congo	are	in	order.	The	Congo	is	
one	 of	 the	 largest	 countries	 in	 Africa	 and	 has	 a	 size	 of	 approximately	 ‘2.500.000	 square	
kilometres’	which	is	comparable	to	the	size	of	Western	Europe.	The	Congo	has	more	than	84	
million	inhabitants	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005	28)	and	this	population	consists	of	more	than	
250	 different	 ethnic	 groups.	 The	 Congo	 is	 incredibly	 wealthy	 in	 natural	 sources,	 which	
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include:	 diamonds,	 copper	 and	 cobalt	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 Partly	 because	 of	 its	
richness	and	distinctive	size,	the	country	has	been	dominated	by	Western	powers	for	many	
years,	the	most	noteworthy	being	Belgium.	
	
Around	 1885	 Congo	 was	 divided	 between	 different	 colonial	 powers	 and	 finally	 became	
property	of	King	Leopold	II	of	Belgium	who	used	the	country	as	his	own	personal	enterprise	
to,	 among	other	 things,	 exploit	 it	 for	 rubber	 (Stearns,	 2011).	Under	 pressure,	 the	 country	
was	handed	over	to	the	Belgium	government	in	1908	when	King	Leopold	II	was	accused	of	
applying	 forced	 labour	 and	was	 criticized	 for	 the	poor	human	 rights	 conditions	within	 the	
country	(Stearns,	2011).	Unfortunately	for	Congo,	this	handover	to	the	Belgium	government	
did	not	immensely	change	the	country’s	situation,	as	the	exploitation	of	resources	continued	
in	the	Congo	as	a	Belgian	colony	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005).	After	being	ruled	by	Belgium	for	
an	 extensive	 time,	 Congo	 finally	 gained	 its	 independence	 in	 1960,	 after	 which	 Joseph	
Mobutu	came	to	power	(Reybrouck,	2012),	and	ruled	the	country	for	the	succeeding	thirty-
two	years	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011).	
Congo’s	newly	regained	independence	was	accompanied	with	a	few	memorable	events	that	
still	remain	present	in	the	collective	memory	of	the	Congolese	people.	During	the	first	year	
of	Mobutu’s	rule	and	Congo’s	independence,	the	first	prime	minister	Patrice	Lumumba	was	
send	 to	prison	were	he	was	assassinated,	 shortly	 after	 (de	Goede,	 2015).	 The	people	 saw	
Lumumba	as	a	freedom	fighter	for	Congo’s	dignity	and	self-determination	and	thus	his	death	
was	considered	an	attempt	of	the	Western	powers	to	protect	their	interests	and	remain	in	
control	over	the	Congo	(de	Goede,	2015).	The	death	of	Lumumba	is,	even	now,	still	deeply	
rooted	 in	 the	 Congolese	 political	 discourse	 as	 being	 victimised	 by	 foreign	 powers	 that	
dominate	 the	 Congo	 and	 is	 believed	 to	 have	 affected	 the	 Congolese	 faith,	 attitudes	 and	
believes	towards	democracy	(de	Goede,	2015).	
In	the	years	following	Lumumba’s	death,	more	changed	under	Mobutu’s	rule	as	he	renamed	
the	 country	 Zaire	 and	 changed	 his	 own	 name	 to	 Mobutu	 Sese	 Seko	 (Stearns,	 2011).	
Furthermore,	 Mobutu	 decided	 to	 nationalize	 the	 mines	 and	 appointed	 friends	 and	 close	
family	 to	 high	 governmental	 positions	 (Reybrouck,	 2012).	 Besides	 being	 blameworthy	 of	
nepotism,	Mobutu	 presumably	 embezzled	 billions	 of	 dollars	 that	 primarily	 came	 from	 the	
‘copper,	cobalt,	diamonds	and	coffee’	trade.	Consequently,	Mobutu	was	additionally	being	
accused	 of	 corruption	 and	 kleptocracy	 (DR	 Congo:	 Chronology,	 2009,	 1;	 Zorbas	 &	 Tohbi,	
2011).	
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After	 decades	 of	 deteriorating	 conditions	 in	 Congo,	 with	Mobutu	 in	 power,	 the	 situation	
became	even	worse	when	 in	 1994	 the	 civil	war	 in	 neighbouring	Rwanda	 reached	 its	 peak	
(Dizolele,	 2010).	 During	 a	 three-month	 period,	 the	 genocide	 in	 Rwanda	 cost	 more	 than	
800.000	human	lives,	with	many	more	people	fleeing	the	country	towards	bordering	states,	
including	 the	 Congo	 (Stearns,	 2011).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 Rwanda,	 the	 country	 of	
Congo	that	was	already	close	to	collapsing	became	host	to	enormous	refugee	camps,	mainly	
located	 in	 the	 eastern	 region	 of	 the	 Congo	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 Besides	 the	
increasingly	 problematic	 refugee	 camps,	 the	 eastern	 provinces	 of	 the	 Congo	 faced	 more	
problems	as	the	active	militias	and	social	movement	groups	that	controlled	the	region	were	
not	 in	 favour	of	 the	current	dictatorship	of	Mobutu	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005).	For	all	 the	
reasons	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 situation	 in	 the	 eastern	 provinces	 became	 increasingly	
hazardous	for	the	Congo,	but	the	fact	that	this	region	also	harboured	most	of	the	country’s	
wealth,	made	the	troubles	in	the	east	even	more	critical	for	the	country	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	
2005).	During	 the	1990s,	numerous	anti-Mobutu	movements	became	active	 in	 the	Congo,	
with	 the	 common	 goal	 of	 ending	 the	 dictatorship	 of	 Mobutu.	 On	 their	 quest,	 social	
movements	and	militias	 received	help	 from	various	African	Countries	 including	Zimbabwe,	
Liberia	 and	Uganda	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 Finally,	 in	 1997,	 Laurent-Desire	 Kabila	 and	
the	coalition	Alliance	of	the	Democratic	Forces	for	the	Liberation	of	the	Congo	(ADFLC),	were	
able	to	overthrow	Joseph	Mobutu,	whereupon	Kabila	came	to	power	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi	2011).	
With	a	new	president	in	power,	Mobutu	was	sent	into	exile	to	Morocco,	where	he	died	not	
long	afterwards	(French,	1997).	
	
Beside	the	new	name	of	the	country	–	it	changed	from	Zaire	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo	–,	the	fall	of	Mobutu	also	entailed	a	new	cycle	of	violence	and	war,	which	led	to	the	
death	of	millions	of	Congolese	people	(Dizolele,	2010).	Around	1998,	Kabila	decided	to	cut	
the	ties	with	Rwanda	and	end	the	military	collaboration,	including	evacuating	the	Rwandans	
who	were	 living	on	Congolese	soil	out	of	 the	country	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005).	Unhappy	
with	 the	 then	 present	 ruler	 Laurent-Desire	 Kabila,	 the	 countries	 Uganda,	 Rwanda	 and	
Burundi	 invaded	 the	 country,	 strongly	 supported	 by	 Western	 powers	 and	 locally	 based	
multinationals	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 The	 Western	 powers	 and	 multinationals	 were	
equally	unhappy	with	Kabila’s	presidency,	as	he	was	not	a	 ‘West	supporter’	 in	 the	way	his	
predecessor	Mobutu	once	was	(de	Goede,	2015).	They	therefore	attempted	a	military	coup	
with	 the	 intention	 to	 overthrow	 president	 Kabila	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 Western	 interests	
(Autesserre,	2009).	However,	they	were	unsuccessful	because	the	Congo	was	not	alone	and	
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received	support	from	various	African	countries,	including	Angola,	Namibia	and	Zimbabwe	in	
adverting	 the	 foreign	 threat	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	With	 so	many	 different	 countries	
involved,	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	Congo	quickly	 turned	 into	a	 regional	one	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	
2005).		
	
In	 august	 1999,	 after	 the	 fighting	 had	 been	 going	 on	 for	 over	 a	 year,	 involving	 not	 only	
multiple	African	countries	but	also	many	rebel	groups,	the	Lusaka	agreement	–	a	ceasefire	
attempt	 to	 end	 the	 Second	 Congo	War	 –	 was	 signed	 by	 seven	 African	 countries	 (Lusaka	
Ceasefire	 Agreement,	 1999).	 Unfortunately,	 the	 ceasefire	 attempt	 failed	 and	 the	 fighting	
continued	 (Autesserre,	 2010).	 A	 few	months	 later,	 the	United	Nations	 decided	 to	 act	 and	
launched	the	peacekeeping	mission,	referred	to	as	MONUC	(Resolution	1279,	1999;	and	see	
above).	MONUC	initially	entailed	500	military	observers	but	was	quickly	extended	with	5.537	
additional	 peacekeeping	 troops	 (Resolution	 1279,	 1999).	 Over	 time,	 MONUC	 faced	 many	
difficulties	 due	 to	 its	weak	mandate	 and	was	 unsuccessful	 in	 stopping	 the	 violence	 in	 the	
Congo	(Autesserre,	2009).		
	
In	 2001	 president	 Kabila	 was	 assassinated	 and	 his	 son	 Joseph	 Kabila	 became	 the	 new	
president	of	the	Congo	(Stearns,	2011).	That	same	year,	the	International	Rescue	Committee	
reported	 that	 the	 death	 total	 in	 the	 Congo	 caused	 by	 the	 war	 had	 reached	 2.5	 million	
(Coghlan	et	al.,	2007).	In	2002	the	situation	seemed	to	improve	slightly.	The	Congo	officially	
became	a	member	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	and	Rwanda	finally	agreed	to	pull	out	
its	troops	under	the	pressure	of	the	international	community	(DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	
The	 United	 Nations	 reinforced	 the	 on-going	 peacekeeping	 mission	 by	 adding	 more	
personnel	to	MONUC,	leading	up	to	8.600	troops	(Resolution	1445,	2002).	In	2003,	Uganda	
was	the	last	country	to	remove	its	troops	out	of	the	Congo	(DR	Congo	country	profile,	2017).	
However,	the	removal	of	the	Ugandan	troops	led	to	an	unwanted	side	effect:	the	new	power	
vacuum	instigated	an	inter-ethnic	conflict	in	the	Ituri	district	(DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	
Following	 this	conflict,	European	troops	–	mostly	French	–	came	to	 the	Congo	and	around	
this	time	the	United	Nations	decided	to	change	the	MONUC’s	mandate	to	allow	for	the	use	
of	force	when	protecting	civilians	(Resolution	1493,	2003).	In	July	2003,	the	troops	that	were	
deployed	in	the	Congo	reached	a	total	of	10.800	(DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009).		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 parallel	 conflict	 occurred:	 Uganda	 and	 Rwanda	 fought	 a	 battle	 on	
Congolese	territory	over	the	control	of	minerals	and	natural	resources	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	
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2005).	The	United	Nations	started	an	investigation	and	reported	that	the	exploitation	of	the	
minerals	had	a	 severe	 sustaining	 impact	on	 the	continuation	of	 violence	within	 the	Congo	
(Autesserre,	2009).	In	the	succeeding	years,	MONUC	was	unable	to	halt	the	fighting	and	the	
death	 toll	 reached	 a	 staggering	 3.9	 million.	 Many	 of	 these	 deaths	 were	 related	 to	 poor	
access	to	medicine	and	scarceness	in	food	supply	(Coghlan	et	al.,	2007).	Despite	the	United	
Nations’	efforts	in	making	MONUC	a	success	by	expanding	the	mission	in	2005	and	sending	
even	more	peacekeepers,	reaching	a	total	of	17.000	peacekeepers,	which	made	MONUC	the	
biggest	United	Nations’	operation	ever	deployed	 (DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	 It	did	not	
appear	 to	 pay	 off:	 violence	 continued	 and	 the	 scheduled	 elections	 of	 2005	 were	 being	
delayed	 (de	 Goede,	 2015).	 The	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	
elections	seemed	to	be	more	difficult	than	initially	had	been	anticipated	and	the	European	
Union	sent	an	additional	2000	men	to	the	Congo	to	support	MONUC’s	missions	(Autesserre,	
2009).		
	
Although	 the	 security	 issues	 on	 the	 ground	 created	 an	 obstacle	 for	 the	 elections,	 the	
logistical	problems	were	just	as	large	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011).	Within	the	Congo	many	people	
did	not	have	identity	papers,	which	made	it	difficult	to	vote	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011).	Another	
major	obstacle	was	the	size	of	the	country.	Never	before	did	the	United	Nations	support	an	
election	of	this	size	and	scale	(Autesserre,	2009).	In	a	country	that	is	referred	to	as	‘Western	
Europe	without	 roads’,	 the	 task	of	distributing	 the	ballots	 and	 the	polling	 stations,	 turned	
out	to	be	a	dreadful	one	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011,	91).	The	realisation	of	elections	in	the	Congo	
took	 a	 total	 of	 ‘50.000	 polling	 stations’;	 ‘40.000	 registration	 officers’	 and	 ‘200.000	 polling	
officers’	who	 all	 needed	 to	 be	 recruited	 and	 then	 trained	before	 the	 elections	 could	 took	
place	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011,	91).		
	
Finally,	in	2006,	the	elections	did	take	place,	involving	33	possible	candidates	competing	to	
become	the	new	president	of	 the	Congo	 (Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011).	During	 the	 first	 round	of	
the	elections,	neither	one	of	the	candidates	got	the	majority	that	was	needed	to	win,	with	
Kabila	getting	45	per	cent	and	Bemba	20	per	cent,	whereupon	a	second	round	followed	(DR	
Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	Kabila	won	the	second	round	with	58	per	cent	of	the	votes,	which	
meant	 a	 loss	 for	Bemba	who	 received	42	per	 cent	of	 the	 votes	 (Zorbas	&	Tohbi	 2011).	 In	
December	 2006,	 Kabila	 established	 himself	 as	 the	 new	 president	 of	 the	 Congo.	 However,	
unfortunately,	 a	 new	 government	 did	 not	mean	 the	 end	 of	 conflict.	 Instead,	 the	 country	
experienced	a	continuation	of	violence	in	the	following	years	(Autesserre,	2010).		
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Discussion:	Analysing	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	within	the	
Congo		
	
The	previous	 chapter	provided	an	 impression	of	 the	historical	 background,	with	 a	 view	 to	
understanding	the	Congo’s	case;	the	present	chapter	will	be	devoted	to	the	analysis	of	how	
democracy	was	promoted	by	MONUC	within	the	Congo.	
	
The	 Congo	 represents	 a	 complicated	 case	 study.	 Many	 actors	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 the	
conflict	 and	 could	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 preventing	 the	 country	 from	 becoming	 a	 well-
functioning	democracy.	However,	in	addition	to	their	great	interference	within	the	country,	
there	were	also	factors	that	were	outside	the	control	of	MONUC	but	nevertheless	hindered	
the	 Congo	 to	 successfully	 become	 a	 democracy.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 draw	
attention	to	some	external	factors,	the	first	one	being	the	country’s	size.	One	might	say	that	
the	Congo	is	cursed	with	its	enormous	size.	This	size,	which	is	comparable	to	that	of	Western	
Europe,	made	 it	 incredibly	difficult	 for	 its	government	and	the	 international	community	 to	
gain	full	control,	both	military	and	governmental,	of	all	regions	(Lumumba-Kasongo,	2005).	
As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 some	 regions	 did	 remain	 relatively	 peaceful	 and	 stable,	 while	 others	
experienced	 large	waves	 of	 violence.	 The	 latter	 included	 the	 eastern	 regions	 –	North	 and	
South	 Kivu,	 Ituri	 and	 North	 Katanga	 –	 which	 were	 highly	 exposed	 to	 the	 violence	 in	 the	
course	of	 the	conflict	 (DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009),	while	 the	North	and	 the	West	of	 the	
Congo	remained	largely	stable	(Autesserre,	2009).		
	
Other	 problems	 that	 arose	 due	 to	 the	 country’s	 enormous	 size,	 were	 the	 difficulties	
regarding	 the	 logistics.	 Since	 the	 country	was	 underdeveloped	 and	 did	 not	 have	 a	 proper	
network	 of	 roads,	 basic	 election	 tasks,	 such	 as	 distributing	 the	 ballots,	 setting	 up	 polling	
stations	 and	 registering	 the	 electorate	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 extremely	 challenging	 (Zorbas	 &	
Tohbi,	2011).		
	 Apart	 from	 its	 size,	 the	 Congo’s	 vast	 wealth	 in	 resources	 and	 minerals	 made	 the	
country	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 interference	 and	 exploitation	 of	 third	 parties	 (Zorbas	 &	 Tohbi	
2011).	 The	 valuable	 assets,	 such	 as	 gold,	 copper,	 coltan	 and	 diamonds	made	 the	 country	
interesting	for	third	parties	and	even	caused	a	parallel	conflict	over	the	exploitation	of	these	
minerals,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 already	present	 conflict	within	 the	Congo	 (McGreal,	 2008).	At	
the	 peak	 of	 the	 conflict,	 fourteen	 foreign	 armies	 were	 active	 in	 the	 Congo	 including	 the	
armies	 of	 Uganda,	 Rwanda	 and	 Angola,	 as	 well	 as	 many	 militias	 and	 rebel	 groups	
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(Autesserre,	 2009).	 Due	 to	 the	 conflict’s	 magnitude,	 the	 death	 toll	 and	 the	 large	 foreign	
involvement,	the	conflict	in	the	Congo	is	frequently	referred	to	as	‘Africa’s	First	World	War’,	
which	only	underlines	the	complexity	and	the	extent	of	the	difficulties	that	MONUC	had	to	
face	within	the	Congo	(McGreal,	2008,	1).		
The	 above-mentioned	 factors	 undeniably	 hindered	 the	 performance	 and	 the	 effect	 of	
MONUC.	However,	MONUC’s	 strategy	 and	mandate	 also	 influenced	a	positive	outcome	 in	
the	 country.	 In	 the	 following	 part,	 the	 focus	 will	 therefore	 shift	 to	 MONUC,	 in	 order	 to	
analyse	 how	 the	 mission	 of	 MONUC,	 as	 performed	 by	 the	 United	 Nations,	 could	 have	
implemented	democracy	more	effectively	within	the	Congo.	
	
When	studying	the	literature	on	the	peacekeeping	mission	of	MONUC,	a	few	shortcomings	
come	 to	 light.	 According	 to	 Autesserre	 (2010),	 one	 of	 the	 great	 difficulties	 that	 MONUC	
faced	was	related	to	the	inadequate	human	resources,	which	subsequently	resulted	in	poor	
communication	 and	organisation	within	 the	mission.	When	 interviewing	 the	 diplomats,	 as	
well	 as	military	 and	 civilian	 personnel	 directly	 involved	 in	 this	mission,	 Autesserre	 (2010)	
found	 that	 both	 military	 and	 civilian	 personnel	 were	 often	 poorly	 informed	 about	 each	
other’s	actions.	The	 lack	of	 internal	organization	within	MONUC	made	 it	difficult	 for	other	
organisations	and	institutions	to	coordinate	and	cooperate	with	MONUC	in	order	to	gather	
information	 about	 the	 on-going	 situation	 in	 the	 Congo,	 which	 prevented	 them	 from	
responding	adequately	(Autesserre,	2010).	Another	problem	that	MONUC	encountered	was	
the	language	barrier.	A	large	portion	of	the	staff	deployed	in	the	Congo	did	not	speak	any	of	
the	major	languages	within	the	region.	The	lack	of	adequate	language	skills	 in	combination	
with	 the	 inexperience	 of	 MONUC’s	 personnel	 and	 the	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 poor	 human	
resources	weakened	MONUC’s	position	in	the	country	(Autesserre,	2010).	MONUC’s	inability	
to	gain	full	control	over	all	regions,	to	halt	the	violence	and	thus	protect	the	population,	led	
to	a	decline	 in	 its	popularity	and	even	made	MONUC	 loose	 its	 legitimacy	 in	 the	region	 (de	
Goede,	2015).		
	
MONUC’s	inability	to	stop	the	violence	can	partly	be	attributed	to	its	strategy	and	mandate.	
Up	and	until	 2003,	MONUC’s	mandate	did	not	allow	 for	 the	use	of	 force	when	protecting	
civilians,	which	greatly	limited	its	effectiveness	in	the	mission’s	early	years	(Resolution	1493,	
2003).	 In	 addition,	 the	 strategy	 solely	 concentrated	 on	 the	 macro	 level,	 barely	 taking	
account	 of	 local	 issues	 and	 actors	 that	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	 continuance	 of	 violence	
(Autesserre,	 2012).	 Within	 the	 Congo,	 much	 was	 happening	 on	 both	 local	 and	 regional	
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levels,	such	as	the	conflict	over	minerals	and	the	violence	bound	up	with	the	refugee	camps	
within	 Kivu	 that	 spilled	 over	 from	 Rwanda	 (Lumumba-Kasongo,	 2005).	 These	 two	 factors	
were	 important	 as	 they	 impacted	 the	 continuing	 violence	 within	 the	 Congo	 (DR	 Congo:	
Chronology,	2009).	Nevertheless,	the	‘peacebuilders	understood	the	continuing	violence	as	
a	 top-down	 problem’	 that	 needed	 a	 ‘top-down	 intervention’	 (Autesserre,	 2012,	 92).	
Consequently,	 instead	 of	 understanding	 the	 underlying	 root	 causes	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	
actively	 including	 local	 movements	 and	militias	 responsible	 for	 the	 violence	 in	 the	 peace	
processes,	 MONUC	 solely	 focussed	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 democracy	 on	 a	 national	 level,	
considering	elections	to	be	the	ultimate	cure	for	the	violence	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	2011).		
	
In	the	last	decades	of	the	20th	century,	elections	did	indeed	gain	popularity	as	a	method	for	
international	conflict	resolution	(Reilley,	2011).	Accordingly,	MONUC’s	main	strategy	within	
the	Congo	was	fixated	on	having	elections	above	anything	else,	as	the	common	assumption	
was	 that	 by	 having	 elections	 a	 stable	 and	 sustainable	 peace	 would	 follow	 (Paris,	 2004).	
Despite	 the	United	Nations	awareness	of	 the	 fact	 that	much	more	 than	 just	elections	was	
needed	 if	 the	 Congo	 was	 to	 succeed	 as	 a	 democracy	 –	 a	 country	 that,	 after	 all,	 had	 no	
impartial	governmental	institutions	in	place	and	had	been	ruled	by	a	dictator	for	the	last	32	
years	–	elections	were	still	pursued	prior	to	all	else	(Autesserre,	2009).		
	
Looking	 back	 on	 the	 theories	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	 thesis	 and	 applying	 those	 to	 the	
strategy	that	was	used	by	MONUC	in	the	Congo,	the	conclusion	can	be	drawn	that	MONUC’s	
strategy	 shares	many	 features	with	 gradualism,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 elections	were	 pursued	
before	 functioning	 institutions	were	 in	 place.	MONUC’s	 focus	 of	 attention	 on	 elections	 is	
however	somewhat	remarkable	in	relation	to	the	mandate	and	resolution	1493	(2003)	that	
share	 more	 similarities	 with	 sequencing	 as	 they	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 necessary	
preconditions	that	should	be	in	place	before	elections	can	be	held.	To	summarise,	resolution	
1493	(2003)	encourages	MONUC	to	reform	security	forces,	to	integrate	and	train	Congolese	
police	 units,	 to	 re-establish	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 while	 preparing	 for	 elections.	 Instead,	 the	
mission	disregarded	the	necessary	preconditions	stated	by	the	Security	Council	and	focussed	
almost	exclusively	on	organizing	the	elections	at	a	very	early	stage	in	the	transition	process	
(Autesserre,	 2009).	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 one	 of	 the	 critiques	 of	 gradualism	 is	 that	
transitioning	 countries	are	 very	 vulnerable	 to	 violence	when	proper	 lawful	 institutions	are	
not	yet	in	place	that	can	avoid	or	control	the	violent	upsurge	that	is	usually	caused	by	open	
political	competition.		
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Looking	 at	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Congo,	 and	 as	was	 to	 be	 expected,	 the	 absence	 of	 stable	 and	
adequately	functioning	institutions	led	to	an	increase	in	tension	during	the	period	leading	up	
to	 the	elections	and	 immediately	after	 the	elections	of	2006,	whilst	violence	again	peaked	
both	in	the	East	and	the	West,	dividing	the	country	in	two	political	factions	(Zorbas	&	Tohbi,	
2011).	 MONUC’s	 blind	 focus	 on	 organizing	 elections	 used	 up	 almost	 all	 the	 international	
financial	 funding	 that	was	 available,	 while	 simultaneously	 neglecting	 the	 root	 causes	 that	
instigated	the	on-going	violence	on	the	ground	(Autesserre,	2010).	Despite	its	clear	failures,	
this	 strategy	 remained	 unaltered	 and	MONUC	maintained	 as	 its	 priority	 to	 have	 elections	
rather	than	resolving	the	security	situation	in	the	country	(Autesserre,	2009).		
	 The	international	community	thus	regarded	free	and	fair	elections	to	be	the	best	and	
only	way	 for	 the	Congo	 to	become	a	democracy	 (DR	Congo:	 Chronology,	 2009).	However,	
one	of	the	absolute	fundamental	preconditions	for	open	democratic	elections	is	freedom	of	
speech	and	added	to	that,	freedom	of	press,	both	of	which	were	painfully	missing	during	the	
transitional	period	in	the	Congo	(DR	Congo:	Chronology,	2009).	Nevertheless,	the	elections	
were	held:	prematurely	and,	as	was	to	be	expected,	the	impact	thereof	was	that	it	increased	
the	separation	between	the	radical	groups	even	further,	sparked	a	new	cycle	of	violence	and	
once	more	intensified	the	ethnic	tensions	(Autesserre,	2009).	
	
When	reflecting	on	the	case	study	and	the	theories	that	show	how	countries	transiting	into	
democracies	 are	 prone	 to	 both	 violence	 and	 ethnic	 or	 political	 separation,	 the	 question	
arises	 how	 one	 can	 explain	 or	 justify	MONUC’s	main	 focus	 on	 elections.	 Various	 scholars	
argue	that	the	elections	within	the	Congo	were	seen	as	an	easy	exit	strategy	that	would	give	
the	 donors	 a	 legitimate	 reason	 to	 stop	 the	 aid,	 end	 the	 peacekeeping	 mission	 and	
subsequently	withdraw	from	the	Congo	(Gillies,	2011).	At	that	time,	the	mission	of	MONUC,	
had	 already	 taken	 more	 time	 and	 money	 than	 was	 initially	 anticipated.	 Hence,	 building	
institutions,	 re-establishing	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	 training	security	 forces	would	only	prolong	
the	 mission	 even	 more,	 which	 explains	 why	 international	 donors	 pressured	 for	 elections	
instead	(Paris,	2004).	Next	to	that,	the	implementation	of	elections	was	also	a	well-defined	
and	 relatively	 easy	 strategy	 that	 is	 common	 to	 the	United	Nations	 peacekeeping	missions	
and	for	which	the	tools	and	the	handbooks	were	already	in	place	(Selby,	2013).	The	problem	
with	MONUC,	 however,	was	 that	 the	mission	 lacked	 properly	 trained	 political	 actors	who	
could	 guide	 the	 transitional	 process	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 elections	 a	 success,	 as	 was	
mentioned	in	a	statement	on	the	Congo	by	former	U.S	Senator	Wolpe	(2009).	According	to	
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Autesserre,	 the	 idea	 that	 after	 the	 elections	MONUC	 and	 its	 donors	 could	 pull	 out	 of	 the	
Congo	 and	 stop	 the	 aid,	 is	 problematic	 because	 elections	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 ‘end	
station’	of	peacebuilding	but	instead	as	just	a	step	on	the	way	to	democracy	(2010).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
25	
Conclusion	
	
This	 thesis	 started	 with	 an	 overview	 of	 various	 theories	 that	 attempted	 to	 review	 the	
promotion	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	 means	 to	 secure	 peace	 within	 countries.	 Next,	 this	 thesis	
provided	a	brief	historical	and	cultural	background	to	the	case	of	the	Congo	and	highlighted	
the	major	 events	 that	 influenced	 the	 Congolese	 people	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 country’s	
current	situation.		
	
This	thesis	was	written	out	of	 interest	 in	the	peacekeeping	mission	MONUC,	performed	by	
the	United	Nations,	in	the	Congo.	Already	at	the	beginning	of	this	thesis,	assumptions	were	
made	that	the	strategy	used	within	MONUC	was	not	suitable	for	the	country	as	it	was	mostly	
concentrated	on	national	 level,	barely	 taking	the	 important	 local	 issues	and	causes	 for	 the	
continuing	 of	 violence	 into	 account.	 Next,	 this	 thesis	 suggested	 that	 the	 promotion	 of	
democracy	 had	 unwanted	 side	 effects	 that	 partly	 evolved	 from	 MONUC’s	 mandate	 that	
prioritised	the	elections	over	the	 implementation	of	 institutions	that	could	have	controlled	
and	 regulated	 the	 violence	 issues	 the	 country	 was	 facing.	 Consequently,	 the	 research	
question	 of	 this	 thesis	 was:	 How	 could	 democracy	 have	 been	 promoted	more	 effectively	
within	the	Congo?	
The	 research	 question	 exclusively	 looks	 at	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Congo.	 Therefore,	 the	
observations	of	and	discussion	in	this	thesis	do	not	necessarily	apply	to	other	countries	that	
are	 transitioning	 into	 democracies.	 However,	 the	 suggestions	 that	 are	 made	 could,	 with	
cautious	 consideration,	 be	 applied	 to	 other	 cases,	 which	 makes	 this	 thesis	 a	 valuable	
addition	to	the	existing	literature	on	the	Congo	and	on	the	promotion	of	democracy.	
	
Before	addressing	 the	 initial	question	of	how	democracy	could	have	been	promoted	more	
effectively	within	the	Congo,	I	should	like	to	briefly	recapitulate	what	went	wrong.	The	main	
focus	of	MONUC	was	solely	based	on	the	implementation	of	democracy	without	taking	any	
of	 the	 necessary	 preconditions	 into	 account.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 premature,	 open	 political	
competition	 within	 the	 Congo,	 tensions	 and	 violence	 arose	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 any	
functional	 institution,	 rule	 of	 law	 or	 police	 force	 in	 place.	 The	 strategy	 which	 the	 United	
Nations	–	possibly	unintentional	 –	 applied	within	 the	Congo	was	one	of	 gradualism,	while	
the	 strategy	 of	 sequencing	 harbours	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 appropriate	
approach.	 For,	 ultimately,	 the	 Congo,	 a	 country	 that	 does	 not	 have	 a	 democratic	 past,	 a	
country	divided	by	ethnic,	cultural	and	even	linguistic	differences,	a	step-by-step	progression	
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to	 becoming	 a	 fully	 functioning	 democracy,	 as	 is	 suggested	 in	 the	 sequencing	 strategy,	
would	be	feasible	and	more	effective	in	the	long	run.	The	reasons	why	this	strategy	was	not	
applied	 is	 probably	 related	 to	 the	 size,	 the	 time	 and	 the	 money	 that	 had	 already	 been	
invested	 in	 the	 peacebuilding	 mission	 in	 the	 Congo.	 Hence,	 the	 international	 community	
wanted	 an	 exit	 strategy	 that	 was	 quick	 and	 legitimate	 (Autesserre,	 2010).	 Establishing	
functioning	 institutions	 would	 have	 involved	 even	 more	 time	 and	 money;	 organizing	
elections	thus	seemed	the	cheapest	and	easiest	way	out.		
	
Along	 with	 the	 inadequate	 strategy	 of	 MONUC,	 the	 mission	 in	 the	 Congo	 was	 also	
confronted	 with	 some	 internal	 demons	 that	 plagued	 the	 country	 and	 challenged	 the	
effective	 promotion	 of	 democracy.	 One	 of	 them	 was	 the	 country’s	 size	 that	 made	 it	
incredibly	difficult	for	both	the	underdeveloped	government	and	MONUC	to	gain	full	control	
of	 all	 regions	 and	 to	 put	 a	 stop	 to	 the	 violence.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 size,	 Congo’s	wealth	 in	
resources	and	minerals	also	made	the	country	interesting	and	attractive	to	third	parties	who	
sought	 to	 exploit	 the	 minerals.	 This	 created	 the	 situation	 of	 many	 countries,	 rebels	 and	
militias	 taking	part	 in	the	conflict,	each	of	 them	with	an	agenda,	making	the	way	to	peace	
and	democracy	an	even	more	difficult	task.	
	
In	view	of	and	based	on	what	has	been	discussed	so	far,	the	answer	to	the	research	question	
–	 How	 could	 democracy	 have	 been	 promoted	 more	 effectively	 within	 the	 Congo?	 –	 is	
twofold.	 Firstly,	 as	 has	 been	 substantiated	 in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 strategy	 and	 mandate	 of	
MONUC	was	inadequate	in	realising	its	desired	outcome	of	establishing	peace	by	promoting	
democracy	within	 the	Congo.	 Instead	of	 prioritizing	 elections,	MONUC	 rather	 should	have	
followed	the	sequencing	approach	by	concentrating	on	the	creation	of	state	institutions	that	
could	have	guided	the	transitional	process,	before	having	the	elections.	
Secondly,	while	studying	the	case	of	the	Congo	it	became	apparent	that	MONUC	was	almost	
exclusively	 a	 top-down	 affair,	 which	 by	 its	 very	 nature	 did	 not	 take	 the	 root	 causes	 and	
bottom-up	dynamics	of	the	conflict	into	account.	In	the	case	of	the	Congo	this	was	evidently	
a	mistake	as	the	country	was	highly	affected	by	its	regional	issues,	such	as	the	exploitation	
and	the	conflict	over	its	minerals	and	the	huge	refugee	camps	on	the	Eastern	borders.	The	
local	 issues	 greatly	 impacted	 the	 continuation	 of	 violence	 on	 a	 national	 level	 and	 even	
undermined	the	performance	of	the	state.	In	the	case	of	the	Congo,	promoting	democracy	
on	a	macro	 level	alone	 turned	out	not	 to	be	effective.	 If	more	attention	had	been	paid	 to	
understanding	 the	dynamics	behind	 the	continuing	of	 violence	and	a	bottom-up	approach	
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had	been	applied	 in	 the	promotion	of	democracy,	 the	Congo’s	 situation	might	possibly	be	
better.			
	
Unfortunately,	not	everything	can	be	addressed	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	which	means	
that	several	valuable	topics	remain	undiscussed.	In	conclusion,	an	important	lesson	that	can	
be	learned	from	this	research	is	that	elections	do	not	equal	democracy	and	while	‘elections	
are	 an	 important	 virtue	 of	 governance,	 they	 are	 not	 the	 only	 virtue’	 (Zakaria,	 1997,	 40).	
Therefore,	 this	 thesis	 endorses	 that	more	 attention	 should	 be	 given	 to	 ‘institutionalising’	
states	before	‘democratising’	them.		
	
Finally:	it	would	be	valuable	for	Western	scholars	and	politicians	to,	at	times,	step	away	from	
the	 Western	 approach	 of	 statehood	 and	 consider	 different	 approaches	 when	 promoting	
democracy,	 for	 instance	 by	 including	 local	 agencies.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 suggest	 that	 further	
research	 should	 focus	on	 the	 role	of	NGO’s	within	 conflict	 zones	 and	 their	 role	 in	 conflict	
resolution.	Moreover,	 further	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	the	 involvement	of	bottom-up	
approaches	 through	 including	 local	 actors	 into	 the	 peace	 process.	 The	 latter	
recommendation	is	based	on	the	fact	that	research	has	already	proven	the	positive	effects	
of	 these	 approaches	 to	 the	 durability	 of	 peace	 by	 including	 regional	 actors	 and	 local	
structures	of	governance	within	international	peace	processes.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
28	
LITERATURE	
Alemika,	E.	E.	(2007)	Working	Paper	No.	84,	‘Quality	of	Elections,	Satisfactions	with	Democracy	and	
Political	Trust	in	Africa’.	Afrobarometer	Working	Papers.	Available	at:	http://	Afrobarometer	
.org/sites	/default/	files/	publications/Policy%20paper/AfropaperNo84.pdf	(accessed:	11-10-
2018).	
	
Autesserre,	S.	(2009)	‘Hobbes	and	the	Congo:	Frames	Local	Violence,	and	International	
Intervention’,	International	Organisation	63,	249-280.	
––––––––––	(2010)	The	Trouble	with	the	Congo:	Local	Violence	and	the	Failure	of	International	
Peacebuilding.	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press.		
––––––––––	(2012)	‘Dangerous	Tales:	Dominant	narratives	on	the	Congo	and	their	unintended	
consequences’,	African	Affairs	111(443),	202-222.	
Barnett,	M.	and	Zurcher,	C.	(2009)	‘The	peacebuilders	contract:	How	external	statebuilding	
reinforces	weak	statehood’,	in:	The	Dilemmas	of	Statebuilding:	Confronting	the	
Contradictions	of	Postwar	Peace	Operations,	Paris,	R.	&	T.	Sisk	(eds.).	Abingdon:	Routledge,	
13-52.		
Boege,	V.,	A.	M.	Brown,	K.	P.	Clements,	A.	Nolan	(2009)	‘On	Hybrid	Political	Orders	and	Emerging	
States:	What	is	Failing	States	in	the	Global	South	or	Research	and	Politics	in	the	West?’,	in:	
Building	Peace	in	the	Absence	of	States:	Challenging	the	Discourse	on	State	Failure	(Berghof	
Handbook	Dialogue	Series	no.8),	Fischer,	M.	and	B.	Schmelzle	(eds.),	Berghof	Research	
Center	for	Constructive	Conflict	Management.	Berlin:	Berghof	Foundation,	15-36.	
	
Carothers,	T.	(2007)	‘The	“Sequencing”	Fallacy’,	Journal	of	Democracy	18(1),	12-27.	
––––––––––	(2007)	‘Misunderstanding	Gradualism’,	Journal	of	Democracy	18(3),	18-22.	
Chan,	S.	(2018)	‘Joseph	Kabila,	Congo	strongman,	Will	Step	Down	After	17	Years	in	Power’,	New	York	
Times,	August	8,	2018.	Available	at:	https://www.nytimes.com/2018	
/08/08/world/africa/josephkabilacongo	
.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FKabila%2C%20Joseph&action=click&contentCollecti
on=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1
&pgtype=collection	(accessed:	20-10-2018).	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
29	
Coghlan,	B.,	P.	Ngoy,	F.	Mumlumba,	C.	Hardy,	V.	Nkamgang	Bemo,	T.	Stewart,	J.	Lewis,	R.	Brennan	
(2007)	‘Mortality	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo:	An	ongoing	crisis’.	International	
Rescue	Committee.	Available	at:	https://www.rescue.org/sites/default	/files/document/	
661/2006-7congomortalitysurvey.pdf	(accessed:	29-01-2018).		
	
Collier,	D.	(2011)	‘Understanding	Process	Tracing’,	Political	Science	and	Politics	44(4),	823-30.	
	
Dizolele,	M.	(2010)	The	Mirage	of	Democracy	in	the	DRC.	Journal	of	Democracy	21(3),	143-157.	
	
DRC	President	Joseph	Kabila	will	not	seek	third	term:	PM	(2018).	Aljazeera,	June	2018.	Available	at:	
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/drc-president-joseph-kabila-seek-term-pm-
180612163432778.html	(accessed:	25-10-2018).	
DR	Congo:	Chronology	(2009)	Available	at:	https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/21	/dr-congo-
chronology	(accessed:	25-01-2018).		
	
DR	Congo	country	profile	(2017)	Available	at:	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13286306	
(accessed:	25-01-2018).	
	
Ebola	virus	disease	–	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	(2018)	Available	at:		
http://www.who.int/csr/don/27-september-2018-ebola-drc/en/	(accessed:	15-10-2018).	
	
French,	H.	W.	(1997)	‘Mobutu	Sese	Seko,	Zairian	Ruler,	is	Dead	in	Exile	in	Morocco	at	66’,	The	New	
York	Times.	Available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/08/world/mobutu-sese-seko-
zairian-ruler-is-dead-in-exile-in-morocco-at-66.html	(accessed:	27-01-2018).		
	
Gillies,	D.	(2011)	‘INTRODUCTION:	Electoral	Democracy	and	the	Paradoxes	of	Peacebuilding’,	in:	
Gillies,	D.	(ed.),	Elections	in	Dangerous	Places:	Democracy	and	the	Paradoxes	of	
Peacebuilding.	Montreal;	Kingston;	London;	Ithaca:	McGill-Queen's	University	Press,	xix-
xxxvi.	
	
Goede,	M.	de	(2015)	‘“Mundele,	it	is	because	of	you“:	History,	Identity	and	the	Meaning	of	
Democracy	in	the	Congo’,	Journal	of	Modern	African	Studies	53(4),	583-609.	
	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
30	
Hennemeyer,	C.	(2011)	‘Democracy	in	Africa:	Rumours	of	Its	Demise	Have	Been	Greatly	
Exaggerated’,	in:	Gillies,	D.	(ed.),	Elections	in	Dangerous	Places:	Democracy	and	the	
Paradoxes	of	Peacebuilding.	Montreal;	Kingston;	London;	Ithaca:	McGill-Queen's	University	
Press,	53-70.	
	
Kant,	I.	(1795)	Kant’s	Principles	of	Politics,	including	his	essay	on	Perpetual	Peace:	A	Contribution	to	
Political	Science.	Transl.	W.	Hastie.	Edinburgh:	Clark,	1891.	
Kuhn,	F.	P.	(2012)	‘The	Peace	Prefix:	Ambiguities	of	the	Word	“Peace”’,	International	Peacekeeping	
19(4),	396-409.	
	
Lumumba-Kasongo,	T.	(2005)	‘International	Interventionism,	Democracy,	and	Peace-building	in	the	
Great	Lakes	of	Africa:	A	Regional	Perspective	to	the	Challenges’,	African	and	Asian	Studies	
4(1-2),	21-50.	
	
Lusaka	Ceasefire	Agreement	(1999)	available	at:	https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/	
drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/Lusaka%20Cease-Fire%20Agreement%20(1999).pdf	
(accessed:	01-06-2018).	
	
Luttwak,	E.	N.	(1999)	‘Give	war	a	chance’,	Foreign	Affairs	78(4).	
	
Madison,	J.	(1788)	The	Federalist	Papers:	No.	51.	Available	at:	
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.	(accessed:	25-01-2017).		
	
Mansfield,	E.	and	J.	Snyder	(2005)	Electing	to	Fight:	Why	Emerging	Democracies	Go	to	War.	
Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.	
––––––––––	(2007)	‘Exchange:	The	“Sequencing”	Fallacy’,	Journal	of	Democracy	18(3),	5-9.	
	
Manson,	K.	(2018)	‘US	ready	to	impose	fresh	sanctions	on	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo’,	Financial	
Times,	August	2018.	Available	at:	https://www.ft.com/content/	565c3308-96eb-11e8-b747-	
fb1e803ee64e?segmentId=9b41d47b-8acb-fadb-7c70-37ee589b60ab	(accessed:	20-10-
2018)	
	
Mazower,	M.	(2012)	Governing	the	World:	The	History	of	an	Idea.	London:	Penguin	Press.	
	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
31	
McGreal,	C.	(2008)	‘The	roots	of	war	in	eastern	Congo’,	The	Guardian.	Available	at:	
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo	(accessed:	30-01-2018).	
	
Medani,	K.	(2004)	‘Statebuilding	in	Reverse:	The	neoliberal	“reconstruction”	of	Iraq’,	Middle	East	
Report,	232.	Available	at:	http://www.merip.org/mer/mer232/state-rebuilding-reverse.	
	
Menkhaus,	K.	(2008)	‘The	rise	of	a	mediated	state	in	Northern	Kenya:	The	Wajir	story	and	its	
implications	for	state-building’,	Afrika	Focus	21(2),	23-38.	
	
Owen,	J.	M.	(1994)	How	Liberalism	Produces	Democratic	Peace,	International	Security	19(2),	87-125.	
––––––––––	(2012)	‘The	Ideas-Power	Nexus’,	Yale	Journal	of	International	Affairs	7(2),	16-22.		
	
Paris,	R.	(2004)	At	War’s	End:	Building	Peace	After	Civil	Conflict.	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	
Press.	
	
Ramsbotham,	O.,	T.	Woodhouse,	H.	Miall	(2011)	Contemporary	Conflict	Resolution,	Third	Edition.	
Oxford,	United	Kingdom:	Polity	Press.	
Reybrouck	D.	van	(2012)	Congo	een	geschiedenis.	Amsterdam:	De	Bezige	Bij.		
	
Reilly,	B.	(2011)	’Understanding	Elections	in	Conflict	Situations’,	in:	Gillies,	D.	(ed.),	Elections	in	
Dangerous	Places:	Democracy	and	the	Paradoxes	of	Peacebuilding.	Montreal;	Kingston;	
London;	Ithaca:	McGill-Queen's	University	Press,	3-18.	
Richmond,	O.	(2009)	’Liberal	Peace	Transitions:	A	Rethink	Is	Urgent’,	Open	Democracy	19:	
http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/49116.	
Selby,	J.	(2013)	‘The	myth	of	liberal	peace-building’,	Conflict,	Security	&	Development	13,	57-86.		
	
Stearns,	J.	(2011)	Dancing	in	the	glory	of	monsters:	The	collapse	of	the	Congo	and	the	Great	War	of	
Africa.	New	York:	PublicAffairs.	
	
Trotha,	T.	Von	(2009)	‘The	Andersson	Principle?	On	the	Difficulty	of	Truly	Moving	Beyond	State-
Centrism’,	in:	Building	Peace	in	the	Absence	of	States:	Challenging	the	Discourse	on	State	
Failure	(Berghof	Handbook	Dialogue	Series	no.8),	Fischer,	M.	and	B.	Schmelzle	(eds.),	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
32	
Berghof	Research	Center	for	Constructive	Conflict	Management.	Berlin:	Berghof	Foundation,	
37-45.	
	
United	Nations	Security	Council	
––––––––––,	Resolution	1297	(1999)	Available	at:	
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279(1999)	(accessed:	26-
01-2018).		
––––––––––,	Resolution	1445	(2002)	Available	at:	
https://monuc.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n0272318.pdf	(1999)	(accessed:	29-01-
2018).		
––––––––––,	Resolution	1493	(2003)	Available	at:	
https://monuc.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n0344315.pdf	(accessed:	29-01-2018).		
––––––––––,	Resolution	1925	(2010)	Available	at:	
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)	(accessed:	26-
01-2018).	
		
United	Nations	Secretary-General	Boutros	Boutros-Ghali	(1992)	Available	at:	
https://archives.un.org/content/un-secretary-general-boutros-boutros-ghali	(accessed:	08-
10-2018).		
Weijer,	F.	de	(2011)	‘Rebuilding	fragile	states:	Changing	the	rules	of	the	game:	Rebuilding	fragile	
states’,	Special	Report,	The	Broker	26,	8-15.	
	
Wolpe,	H.	(2009)	Former	U.S.	Senator,	Panel	on	‘War	Again	in	the	Eastern	Congo:	International	
Engagement’,	January	2009.		
	
Zakaria,	F.	(1997)	‘The	Rise	of	Illiberal	Democracy’,	Foreign	Affairs	76(6),	22-43.	
	
Zeese,	K.	(2006)	‘Looting	by	Another	Name:	The	Corporate	Take-Over	of	Iraq’s	Economy’,	
Counterpunch	10.	Available	at:	http://www.counterpunch.org/2006/05/10/the-corporate-
takeover-of-iraq-s-economy/	(Accessed:	08-10-2017).		
	
Zorbas,	E.	and	V.	Tohbi	(2011)	Election-Related	Conflict	Resolution	Mechanisms:	The	2006	Elections	
in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	in:	Gillies,	D.	(ed.),	Elections	in	Dangerous	Places:	
Emily	Hermes,	s1811436	
	
33	
Democracy	and	the	Paradoxes	of	Peacebuilding.	Montreal;	Kingston;	London;	Ithaca:	McGill-
Queen's	University	Press,	90-104.	
	
	
	
